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AID	RELATIONSHIPS	AND	THE	GLOBAL	ECONOMIC	
ORDER	
	
The	unity	and	stability	of	the	global	economic	system	
has	always	depended	on	aid	relationships	that	sustain	
the	concessional	transfers	from	rich	donor	countries	
to	poor	countries.	These	transfers	depend	on	voluntary	
exchanges	between	sovereign	governments,	multilateral	
organizations,	and	civil	society	organizations	
and	individuals,	but	they	also	form	a	partially	coordinated	
system	of	aid	relationships	that	impose	real	
obligations	on	their	participants,	even	if	they	are	not	
subject	to	collective	control	and	enforcement.	This	
system	of	global	governance	is	coordinated	by	the	IMF	
and	World	Bank	(the	IFIs),	the	UN,	the	Development	
Assistance	Committee	(DAC)	of	the	OECD,	development	
ministries	in	donor	countries,	the	international	
NGO	community,	and	their	counterparts	in	recipient	
countries.	It	has	been	established	to	address	a	variety	
of	threats	caused	by	international	inequality	and	
exclusion,	economic,	political,	and	humanitarian	crises,	
mass	migration,	and	environmental	degradation.	
The	agreements	cannot	be	imposed	on	states,	NGOs,	
and	private	donors,	but	they	do	represent	an	ordered	
system,	even	if	it	works	according	to	what	Bull	
(1977)	calls	anarchic	principles,	because	it	depends	
on	voluntary	but	binding	agreements	and	mutual	benefits	
rather	than	centralized	enforcement.	This	raises	
complex	questions	about	the	effectiveness	of	aid,	and	
different	kinds	of	aid	relationships,	especially	in	the	
least	developed	countries	(LDCs),	where	their	ability	
and	willingness	to	implement	agreements	may	be	low.	
Aid	has	made	important	contributions	to	global	
governance,	but	its	practices,	motivations,	and	achievements	
are	heavily	contested.	While	its	supporters	
argue	that	aid	increases	the	welfare	of	rich	and	poor	
countries	by	stabilizing	the	open	global	order,	its	critics	
claim	that	the	system	is	driven	by	selfish	national	
interest	and	perverse	incentives,	creating	considerable	
waste	and	bad	performance	(Moyo,	2009;	Easterly,	
2006;	Bauer,	1972;	Engberg-Pedersen,	1996;	Ferguson,	
1996;	Bond	and	Manyaya,	2002).	Both	views	rest	on	
credible	evidence,	which	will	be	briefly	reviewed	in	
the	following	sections.	
The	article	first	outlines	the	historical	development	
of	the	aid	system.	It	then	presents	the	policy	
challenges	faced	by	donors	and	the	system	itself.	
Next,	the	strategies	of	Political	Economy	Analysis	
(PEA)	and	New	Public	Management	(NPM)	to	improve	
aid	effectiveness	are	presented	and	critically	reviewed.	
Finally,	the	future	role	of	EU-Africa	cooperation	
is	briefly	discussed.	
THE	HISTORY	OF	AID	RELATIONSHIPS	
Changes	in	the	global	system,	the	political	climate,	
and	crises	have	produced	significant	changes	in	the	
power	relations	and	political	strategies	that	govern	
the	international	aid	system.	
Colonial	powers	began	aid	programs	in	the	1920s	
and	1930s	to	strengthen	economic	relations	with	their	
colonies,	where	they	used	aid	to	build	the	infrastructure	
needed	to	export	raw	materials	and	their	own	
manufactured	goods	(Brett,	1973).	The	modern	aid	
system	was	created	in	the	1940s	by	the	US,	the	IMF,	
and	the	World	Bank	to	deal	with	post-war	and	then	
post-colonial	reconstruction;	it	was	transformed	through	
Structural	Adjustment	Programs	(SAPs)	in	the	
1970s	and	1980s,	which	promoted	the	shift	from	stateto	
market-led	development	(Bauer,	1972;	World	Bank,	
1981;	Little,	1982;	Lal,	1984).	This	induced	fundamental	
structural	and	political	consequences	for	LDCs	and	
post-communist	states	since	SAPs	forced	them	to	cut	
deficits,	devalue	currencies,	privatize	state-owned	
enterprises,	and	reduce	state	controls	over	domestic	
and	international	markets.	It	produced	radical	changes	
in	the	allocation	of	wealth	and	power	that	benefitted	
strong	firms	and	states,	but	were	resisted	by	
threatened	groups,	evaded	by	rent-seeking	regimes,	
and	imposed	excessive	demands	on	weaker	states	
that	lacked	the	capacities	needed	to	implement	them.	
Democratic	reforms	were	included	in	SAPs	in	order	
to	improve	accountability	by	replacing	weak	regimes,	
and/or	to	strengthen	the	ability	of	excluded	groups	
to	influence	their	behavior,	strengthening	the	“third	
democratic	wave”	that	took	place	in	the	1980s	and	
1990s.	(Acemoglu	and	Robinson,	2006;	Huntingdon,	
1991).	This	was	accompanied	by	a	critique	of	austerity-	
oriented	SAPs	and	a	shift	to	Poverty	Reduction	Programs	
(PRPs)	that	still	focused	on	market-based	policies,	
but	also	recognized	the	need	to	strengthen	state	
capacity	and	invest	in	pro-poor	
services,	small-scale	enterprises,	
and	micro-credit	systems	(Hickey,	
2012).	
In	the	21st	century,	the	
focus	shifted	to	global	agreements	
turning	democracy	and	
poverty	reduction	into	a	binding	
obligation.	This	resulted	in	a	series	
of	high-level	agreements,	
which	were	negotiated	and	led	
to	the	Millennium	Development	
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Goals	(MDGs)	in	2000,	the	Paris	Declaration	on	Aid	
Effectiveness	in	2005,	and	the	Sustainable	Development	
Goals	(SDGs)	in	2016.	
These	agreements	represent	a	serious	attempt	
to	avert	the	tensions	generated	by	earlier	aid	policies,	
but	they	ignore	many	serious	obstacles	that	
are	caused	by	deeper	and	more	persistent	problems	
–	conflicts	over	limited	resources,	growing	poverty,	
exclusion,	and	inequality	in	fragile	states	that	cannot	
compete	effectively	in	increasingly	open	world	
markets,	resistance	from	deep-rooted	political	and	
economic	elites,	the	refusal	of	rich	countries	and	individuals	
to	forego	unsustainable	consumption	levels,	
and	the	reluctance	of	poor	countries	to	avoid	
increasing	emissions	to	catch	up.	These	problems	will	
undoubtedly	be	greatly	intensified	in	unpredictable	
ways	by	the	economic	dislocation	caused	by	ongoing	
attempts	to	control	the	COVID-19	pandemic	(Carboni	
and	Casola,	2020).	
At	the	same	time,	the	aid	industry	has	become	
more	complex	and	fragmented.	New	public	donors	
such	as	China	and	private	donors	like	the	Gates	Foundation,	
international	and	local	NGOs,	and	private	companies	
have	gained	influence.	
THE	COMPLEXITY	AND	CHALLENGES	OF	AID	
RELATIONSHIPS	
Aid	may	involve	mutual	interests	and	cooperation,	
but	it	can	also	involve	serious	tensions,	especially	
in	LDCs	where	governments	have	limited	resources,	
represent	opposing	groups,	and	operate	in	a	context	
of	intense	poverty,	insecurity,	and	contested	power	
relationships.	
In	aid-dependent	countries,	aid	makes	a	significant	
contribution	to	the	budget	and	thus	generates	
intense	competition	between	different	parties,	
such	as	government,	civic	organizations,	etc.	Donors	
play	a	key	role	as	they	can	give	or	withhold	support.	
However,	their	control	is	always	incomplete	because	
non-compliant	rulers	and	their	supporters	have	sovereign	
rights	and	can	therefore	evade	unacceptable	demands.	
Donors	are	often	willing	to	fund	under-performing	
programs	in	order	to	spend	their	budgets;	they	
may	disapprove	of	repressive	regimes,	but	they	cannot	
impose	their	decisions	on	them,	and	are	obliged	to	
avoid	partisan	political	interventions	that	challenge	
their	political	authority	or	strengthen	opposition	parties	
and	movements.	
However,	since	their	decisions	play	a	key	role	in	
maintaining	or	undermining	weak	states	and	their	
leaders,	their	interventions	have	unavoidable	political	
and	policy	consequences.	The	aid	system	is	therefore	
based	on	asymmetric	power	relationships,	disputed	
sovereignties,	and	competing,	often	contradictory	objectives.	
Aid	relations	depend	not	only	on	the	interests	
and	capacities	of	the	individual	partners,	but	also	on	
the	tensions	that	arise	in	the	negotiation	and	implementation	
of	agreements	between	partners.	They	are	
governed	by	weakly	enforced	rules	and	divergent	goals	
that	produce	contingent	outcomes	that	depend	on	
the	bargaining	power	of	each	side.	Thus,	while	donors	
try	to	promote	programs	that	are	consistent	with	global	
agreements,	their	own	resources,	and	the	interests	
of	their	supporters,	the	success	of	those	programs	
depends	on	whether	they	are	compatible	with	the	
interests	of	local	governments	and	on	their	ability	or	
inability	to	resist	unacceptable	demands.	
Recognizing	these	tensions	provides	us	with	a	
realistic	approach	to	the	complex	and	contentious	
processes	of	negotiating	mutually	beneficial	agreements	
and	an	appropriate	regulatory	framework.	It	
also	raises	difficult	questions	about	the	role	and	effectiveness	
of	aid	conditionality,	and	the	current	commitment	
to	local	leadership	and	political	ownership	
embedded	in	the	Paris	Agreement	and	SDGs.	
A	realistic	approach	shows	that	aid	relationships	
do	not	depend	on	aid	per	se,	but	on	the	nature	of	the	
interests	that	motivate	the	behavior	of	the	governments	
and	social	movements	on	both	sides.	Donors	
should	learn	from	the	failures	and	successes	of	the	
past,	recognize	the	need	to	challenge	the	authority	
of	repressive	elites,	and	recognize	the	limits	of	the	
neoliberal	assumption	that	free	markets,	democratic	
elections,	and	“local	ownership”	will	produce	propoor	
solutions.	
The	ability	of	weak	states	to	evade	formal	conditionality	
in	the	1990s	led	donors	to	shift	support	
to	stronger	states	with	“good	policies”	(Collier	and	
Dollar,	2002,	1476;	Ritzan	et	al.,	2000),	marginalizing	
the	poorest	people	in	the	poorest	countries.	Despite	
the	exclusion	of	formal	conditionality	in	current	aid	
agreements,	donor	judgements	about	the	ability	of	
any	state	to	respond	to	their	demands	represent	a	
powerful	form	of	implicit	conditionality	and	influence	
the	scale	and	terms	of	their	support.	Thus,	aid	negotiations	
are	relatively	collegial	in	successful	states	
like	Ghana	and	Uganda,	but	heavily	contested	in	
fragmented	states	like	Nigeria,	Pakistan,	and	Nicaragua,	
where	regimes	are	not	committed	to	poverty	
alleviation	and	political	and	economic	settlements	
are	characterized	by	disruptive	class,	ethnic,	or	sectarian	
conflicts.	The	donors’	ability	to	sustain	viable	
programs	in	fragile	states	like	Afghanistan,	Somalia,	
and	the	DRC,	which	can	no	longer	“exercise	effective	
power	within	their	own	territories”	(Clapham,	1996,	
21)	is	even	more	problematic.	
Thus	credible	explanations	for	success	or	failure	
depend	on	the	ability	to	identify	the	political	and	economic	
tensions	that	govern	interactions	between	donors	
and	recipients	at	local,	national,	and	global	levels	as	
both	donors	and	recipients	attempt	to	reconcile	their	
often	contradictory	goals	and	policy	paradigms,	especially	
in	fragile	and	fragmented	states.	This	requires	
a	holistic	and	interdisciplinary	approach,	which	has	
produced	excellent	research	on	the	national	variables	
that	influence	the	behavior	of	either	donor	or	
recipient	governments	(Gulrajani,	2014;	Brown,	2013;	
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Copestake	and	Williams,	2013)	but	far	less	emphasis	
on	the	contradictory	processes	generated	by	the	interactions	
between	donors	and	recipients	in	different	
contexts	and	periods.	
The	tensions	within	aid	relationships	and	resulting	
crises	have	led	donor	countries	to	address,	rather	
than	evade,	the	problem	of	bad	governance	and	bad	
policies,	and	have	confronted	them	with	two	key	challenges:	
to	persuade	reluctant	rulers	to	respond	to	democratic	
demands	and	implement	pro-poor	policies;	
and	to	strengthen	the	organizational	systems	required	
to	do	so.	They	have	turned	to	Political	Economic	
Analysis	(PEA)	to	help	them	understand	and	respond	
to	the	first,	and	to	New	Public	Management	(NPM)	
to	address	the	second	challenge.	Both	attempts	will	
be	explored	in	more	detail	in	the	following	section.	
ATTEMPTS	TO	INCREASE	AID	EFFECTIVENESS	
Political	Economic	Analysis	(PEA)	
The	critical	role	of	political	variables	in	aid	effectiveness	
is	now	widely	recognized.	Donors	are	aware	of	
their	role	within	recipient	countries	and	have	created	
a	body	of	interdisciplinary	policy	theory	referred	to	as	
PEA.1	It	should	“encourage	donors	to	think	not	only	
about	what	to	support,	but	also	about	how	to	provide	
support,”	(DFID,	2009)	taking	political	feasibility	
into	account.	
Several	studies	have	reviewed	the	impact	of	PEA	
on	aid	policies.	According	to	Unsworth	(2009)	it	has	
improved	“the	scope	and	quality	of	internal	debate	
among	donor	staff”	by	increasing	the	awareness	of	
political	systems	and	their	impact	on	development.	
However,	most	studies	emphasize	the	limited	nature	
of	its	impact,	especially	in	weak	states,	as	the	fragile	
structures	and	contradictory	norms,	incentives,	and	
political	constraints	impose	serious	constraints	on	
applying	PEA.	Unsworth	(2009,	884)	also	points	out	
that	it	is	“influencing	specific	aspects	of	donor	activity,	
[but]	it	is	not	prompting	a	more	fundamental	
reappraisal	of	the	implicit	model	of	how	development	
happens.”	
Nevertheless,	PEA	provides	the	policy	community	
with	critical	insights	into	the	role	of	political	variables	
in	policy	reform,	and	the	limitations	of	formal	
conditionality	in	obliging	weak	states	to	adopt	propoor	
programs.	PEA	recognizes	that	aid	effectiveness	
indeed	depends	“primarily	on	efforts	at	the	country	
level”	and	on	the	need	for	donors	to	“focus	on	facilitating	
these	efforts,	not	on	trying	to	replace	them”	
(Booth	2011:	3),	and	provides	us	with	the	best	informed	
analysis	yet	available	of	the	challenges	involved	
in	combining	“local	ownership”	with	pro-poor	policies.	
1	“Political	economy	analysis	is	concerned	with	the	interaction	of	
political	and	economic	processes	in	a	society:	the	distribution	of	
power	and	wealth	between	different	groups	and	individuals,	and	the	
processes	that	create,	sustain,	and	transform	these	relationships	
over	time”	(DFID,	2009).	
The	emerging	consensus	calls	for	interventions	
that	work	with	local	needs,	capacities,	and	interests	
(Levy,	2014).	It	tries	to	ensure	that	“functioning	(or	performance	
levels),	achieved	via	whatever	means	enjoys	
political	legitimacy	and	cultural	resonance”	(Pritchett	
et	al.	2010).	It	seeks	to	replace	governance	reform	by	
a	“theory	of	change”2,	where	micro-level	initiatives	
provide	a	platform	for	the	emergence	of	“islands	of	
effectiveness”	within	a	broader	sea	of	dysfunction	–	
securing	some	gains	in	the	short	term,	and	serving	as	
a	platform	for	cumulative	gains	over	the	longer	run	in	
both	governance	and	poverty	reduction	(Levy,	2014).	
However,	PEA	underestimates	the	need	to	transform	
the	authoritarian	institutions	that	enable	their	rulers	
and	supporters	to	suppress	the	local	movements.	
Theorists	argue	that	liberal	democratic	states	are	
a	necessary	precondition	for	progressive	cooperative	
solutions	(for	an	extended	analysis	see	Brett,	2009).	
However,	donors	cannot	rely	on	conditionality	or	moral	
exhortation	to	strengthen	the	ability	of	excluded	
elites	and	the	poor	to	force	repressive	regimes	to	acknowledge	
their	right	to	“binding	consultation”	(Tilly,	
2007)	or	invest	directly	in	organizations	involved	in	
partisan	politics.	However,	donors	can	help	them	to	
develop	the	consciousness	and	organizational	capacities	
needed	to	do	so.	
The	PEA	literature	acknowledges	this	need,	but	
could	do	more	to	strengthen	civil	society	and	the	
state	by	investing	in	the	organizational	capacity	of	
business	and	labor	organizations,	civic	associations,	
media	and	advocacy	groups,	and	tertiary	education,	
which	has	been	neglected,	thus	weakening	the	society’s	
leadership	and	organizational	capacity	that	is	
an	essential	prerequisite	for	long-term	democratic	
development	(Brett,	2017).	This	always	involves	an	
implicit	threat	to	their	political	neutrality,	so	donor	
states	need	to	find	ways	to	do	this	without	involving	
themselves	directly	in	partisan	politics	–	one	good	
example	being	the	role	of	the	German	political	foundations	
like	the	Konrad	Adenauer	and	Friedrich	Ebert	
Foundations.	
New	Public	Management	(NPM)	
The	aid	literature	has	concentrated	on	the	macro-level	
relationships	between	donors	and	their	local	counterparts,	
rather	than	the	micro-level	“agency”	problems	
involved	in	reforming	the	organizational	systems	that	
determine	the	terms	that	donors	impose	on	the	implementing	
agencies	at	the	local	level	that	carry	out	
their	projects	and	programs.	These	agency	problems	
need	to	be	addressed	by	reforming	the	incentive	and	
authority	systems	that	govern	public	and	private	service	
delivery	systems.	
2	“A	theory	of	change	is	a	detailed	description	of	the	mechanisms	
through	which	a	change	is	expected	to	occur	in	a	particular	situation.	
A	theory	of	change	identifies	the	goals,	preconditions,	requirements,	
assumptions,	interventions,	and	indicators	of	a	program,	
providing	important	insight	into	and	guidance	on	intervention	and	
impact	evaluation	design”	(World	Bank,	2020).	
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Donors	formerly	focused	exclusively	on	state-	
managed	projects,	but	state	failure	and	the	shift	
to	neoliberal	theory	has	led	them	to	fund	private	firms	
and	NGOs	that	are	directly	accountable	to	donors	or	
consumers.	This	can	undermine	state	capacity,	but	
adoption	of	a	pluralistic	strategy	that	tailors	solutions	
to	the	differing	needs	and	capacities	of	different	kinds	
of	community	and	society	now	dominates	the	policy	
agendas	of	all	DCs	as	well	as	LDCs.	It	is	informed	by	
NPM	theory,	which	identifies	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	
of	the	authority,	incentive,	and	accountability	
systems	that	motivate	governments,	firms,	and	civic	
organizations	and	enables	practitioners	to	make	informed	
rather	than	ideological	choices	between	them.	
These	capacities	differ	in	strong,	weak,	or	conflicted	
states,	which	enables	donors	to	tailor	their	
interventions	to	suit	their	specific	needs	by	funding	
projects	that	increase	the	ability	of	recipients	to	use	
voice	and/or	exit	to	demand	better	services	from	their	
agencies	(Hirschman,	1970;	Paul,	1992).This	approach	
gives	practitioners	a	menu	of	organizational	options,	
rather	than	an	externally	designed	template,	and	one	
that	incorporates	the	possibility	of	“hybrid”	solutions	
that	combine	external	and	local	practices	in	creative	
ways	in	order	to	take	account	of	the	weaknesses	and	
conflicts	that	characterize	fragile	and	fragmented	states	
(Malinowski,	1945/1961;	Brett,	2009;	2016).	Thus,	
while	NPM	can	be	used	to	weaken	the	state	and	lead	
to	regressive	“public-private	partnerships,”	it	can	also	
be	used	not	only	to	strengthen	the	ability	of	the	state	
to	regulate	the	whole	system	but	also	to	redistribute	
resources	and	weaken	the	ability	of	repressive	rulers	
to	use	old-style	monopolistic	state	bureaucracies	to	
extract	rents	and	suppress	opposition.	
The	ability	of	private	firms	and	civics	to	function	
effectively	also	depends	on	the	ability	of	progressive	
social	and	political	movements,	including	
donors	themselves,	both	to	strengthen	their	capacity	
to	demand	progressive	reforms	and	to	resist	attempts	
by	their	opponents	to	block	them.	Thus	donors	need	
to	develop	long-term	programs	designed	to	support	
a	long-term	transition	to	“best-practice”	institutions	
in	weak	states	by	combining	PEA	and	NPM	strategies	
by	investing	in	the	organizational	systems	that	represent	
excluded	classes	and	the	awareness	of	the	
beneficiaries	that	receive	them,	as	well	as	the	actual	
agencies	that	supply	pro-poor	services.	However,	they	
should	also	accept	the	need	for	“second-best”	hybrid	
solutions	in	the	short	run,	which	may	not	meet	
the	standards	set	by	the	SDGs,	but	do	incorporate	
and	adapt	local	institutions	and	thus	enable	them	to	
generate	new	and	better	solutions	that	local	people	
can	actually	“own”.	
CONCLUSION:	THE	FUTURE	OF	EU-AFRICA	
COOPERATION	
This	analysis	shows	how	PEA	and	NPM	could	still	be	
used	to	improve	EU-Africa	cooperation,	but	our	ability	
to	do	so	will	be	severely	tested	by	the	disruptive	impact	
of	Brexit	and	the	COVID-19	pandemic.	Brexit	will	
end	the	UK’s	contributions	to	the	EU	aid	budget	and	
the	country’s	ability	to	influence	EU	aid	policies,	while	
the	global	lockdown	has	forced	all	states	to	control	
social	behavior	and	rescue	the	private	sector	from	
its	disruptive	effects.	This	has	generated	the	deepest	
economic	recession	in	modern	history,	which	has	taken	
neoliberal	policies	off	the	agenda	and	imposed	
potentially	unsustainable	strains	on	already	weakened	
state	apparatuses	across	Africa.	
Our	ability	to	rescue	the	liberal	global	order	from	
a	potential	catastrophe	now	depends	on	the	ability	
of	DCs	to	mobilize	the	resources	needed	to	get	their	
citizens	back	to	work	by	refinancing	the	corporate	and	
private	sectors	now	threatened	by	bankruptcy,	and	to	
help	African	states	to	manage	their	fiscal	crises	and	
restore	their	productive	capacity.	This	challenge	is	
comparable	to	the	post-war	crisis	that	gave	birth	to	
the	modern	aid	system,	but	is	taking	place	when	European	
aid	budgets	will	be	subjected	to	intense	stress.	
We	need	a	comparably	radical	response	now	that	will	
demand	major	changes	in	all	of	the	structures	and	
economic	policy	regimes	that	have	dominated	the	
aid	system	since	the	structuralist	crisis	of	the	1980s.	
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